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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
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vs. 
JACK WILKINSON, 
Defendant / Appellant 
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ARGUMENT 
I. The Trial Court Erred in Denying Wilkinson's Motion to Suppress 
Defendant herein did not and does not dispute that the initial traffic stop 
was justifiable; concomitantly, the State does not dispute that Wilkinson was 
detained and that the question is therefore whether the detention Uwwas reasonably 
related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first 
place." Answer Brief, p. 7, quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 
1879, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 905 (1968). The State then argues that, because the use of 
a drug-detection dog during the routine traffic stop did not prolong the stop 
beyond the time reasonably required to complete it, Wilkinson's Fourth 
Amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures was not 
violated. 
The State's argument would hold more weight had Wilkinson been the 
driver of the vehicle - but he was the backseat passenger, against whom there was 
no articulable suspicion of anything before the drug-sniffing dog arrived. 
"[W]hen an officer stops a vehicle for a traffic violation, he may briefly 
detain the vehicle and its occupants while he examines the vehicle registration and 
the driver's license." State v. Schlosser, 11A P.2d 1132, 1135 (Utah 1989) 
(emphasis added, citation omitted). Even post-Cabelles1, the "length and scope of 
the detention must be 'strictly tied to and justified by' the circumstances which 
rendered its initiation permissible." State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761, 762 (Utah 
1991% quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20, 88 S.Ct at 1879. 
A police officer is justified in further detaining a car "and its occupants 
when the driver fails to produce identification or is not the owner." Johnson, 805 
P.2d at 762, citing United States v. Harris, 528 F.2d 1327, 1330 (8th Cir.1975) 
and United States v. Hunter, All F.2d 6, 7 (9th Cir.1972). That is not the case 
here. The driver of the vehicle in which Wilkinson was riding produced 
identification (albeit suspended), and her ownership of the car was never disputed. 
She was issued a citation but not arrested (R. 208:13 11. 4-6). Thus, there was no 
justification to find an alternative driver or to run a warrants check on the other 
two passengers' driver's licenses. "Running a warrants check without reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity beyond the traffic offense itself arguably exceeds the 
reasonable scope of a traffic stop." State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 
1
 Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 125 S.Ct. 834, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005). 
2 
1994). Furthermore, the officer admittedly at that time had no reason to believe 
that narcotics were present (R. 208:14 11. 1-3). Yet, the officer extended the length 
and scope of the detention, ultimately resulting in Wilkinson's arrest. "Once a 
Fourth Amendment seizure has occurred, any detention for reasons exceeding the 
scope of the original stop and not reasonably related to the circumstances 
justifying the stop in the first place, is illegal." State v. Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d 
652, 654 (Utah App. 1992). 
The State focuses heavily on the negligible amount of time it took to secure 
and utilize the drug-sniffing dog. Answer Brief, pp. 10-20. However, it is 
undisputed that the officer took some time to summon the K9 unit and to convey 
"what was happening" once the other officer and his dog arrived. Necessarily, 
then, the routine traffic stop was extended "beyond the time reasonable required to 
complete [it]"2 - even if only by a few seconds or minutes. "A seizure that is 
justified solely by the interest in issuing a warning ticket to the driver can become 
unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete that 
mission." Id, Because this officer prolonged the traffic stop long enough to 
summon another officer, Wilkinson's detention became at that point unlawful. 
a[E]ven a small intrusion beyond the legitimate scope of an initially lawful search 
is unlawful under the Fourth Amendment." Schlosser, supra, 11A P.2d at 1135. 
Caballes, therefore, is distinguishable from the instant case on two critical 
points. First, Caballes concerned the use of a drug-detection dog on the driver of 
2
 Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407, 125 S.Ct. at 837. 
3 
a vehicle who was speeding, rather than on a passenger such as Wilkinson -
against whom there was no articulable suspicion. Second, in Caballes, the officer 
with the drug-sniffing dog arrived at the scene without being summoned by the 
officer initiating the traffic stop, whereas here, the original officer took the 
additional time to send for the other officers. Where someone is being unlawfully 
detained, even the Caballes Court acknowledged that productive dog sniff would 
constitute an unconstitutional seizure. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407-08, 125 S.Ct. at 
837, citing People v. Cox, 202 I11.2d 462, 270 Ill.Dec. 81, 782 N.E.2d 275 (2002). 
This Court "cannot condone unconstitutional police conduct simply 
because it yields favorable results." Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d 655 at fh. 2. Here, as 
in Johnson, "the officer's detention of the passenger beyond what was reasonably 
related in scope to the traffic stop was not justified by an articulable suspicion that 
defendant had committed a crime. Defendant's fourth amendment rights were 
violated, and the evidence obtained pursuant to the arrest is to be suppressed." 
Johnson, 805 P.2d at 764. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Wilkinson asks that this Court reverse the trial court's denial of his motion 
to suppress, vacate his conviction, and remand this case to the Fourth District 
Court for further proceedings. 
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